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Liberalism and the Limits of Procreative
Liberty: A Response to My Critics
John A. Robertson*
Children of Choice' is an argument for the primacy of procreative
liberty m determining public, policy for new reproductive technologies. It
argues that the strong commitment to procreative liberty that exists m law,
morality, and social practice entails an equally strong commitment to liberty
m the use of new reproductive technologies. It then traces the implications
of such an approach for seven controversial reproductive technologies,
including the use of noncoital means of conception.
The commentators in this Symposium take issue with giving procreative
liberty center stage. They deny that reproductive choices involving assisted
reproduction have or should have any special priority In addition, they find
that the use of these techniques causes a variety of harms that outweigh their
claimed status as rights. As a result, the commentators would severely
restrict or prohibit many uses of reproductive technology that I claim are an
individual's or a couple's right.2
In my view, the commentators have not made a convincing case against
the rights-based approach of Children of Choice. In some instances, they
have simply misunderstood the argument. In others, they have failed to
grasp the extent to which a rights-based approach is consistent with
* Thomas Watt Gregory Professor, School of Law, University of Texas at Austin.
A.B. Dartmouth College, 1964; J.D. Harvard University, 1968. I am grateful to the four
commentators for many interesting points that have stimulated me to think more deeply about
the issues addressed in Children of Choice. I am also grateful to the Washington and Lee
University School of Law and to the Washington and Lee Law Review for giving me the
opportunity to confront these issues both m a public forum and in writing. I also wish to thank
my colleague Richard Markovits for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEw REPRODUC-
TivE TECHNOLOGIES (1994).
2. Or so it appears. The commentators are often vague as to the precise policy
outcome that they support.
233
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 233 (1995)
regulatory policies that would prevent the harms which they fear. Some-
times, the commentators are unwilling to acknowledge the implications of a
previously granted premise, or they simply disagree about a normative or
policy matter over which reasonable persons may differ.3
In their zeal to show the excesses of a rights-based approach to
reproductive matters, the commentators also miss a large area of agreement.
Although arguing for the primacy of procreative liberty, Children of Choice
never claimed that such an approach is the sole relevant perspective on these
techniques. Children of Choice explicitly recognized the insights that other
perspectives might bring and thus left ample room for grappling with the
questions of caring, trust, and mutual concern that arise with use of
reproductive technologies. But these questions take center stage only after
we have recognized the crucial role that rights play Rights m reproduction
are not everything, but we cannot do without them, even as we struggle with
questions about their scope and best use.
In order to show why rights discourse is necessary but not sufficient to
encompass reproductive technology, I address the arguments of the
commentators under three headings. Each writer raises questions about the
scope and derivation of a right of procreative liberty, about the harms that
justify ovemding that liberty, and about the extent to which the state should
discourage or facilitate its use. Such common issues are no accident, for
they reflect the normative choices and trade-offs that the liberal rights
analysis of Children of Choice entails.
L Scope and Derivation of Procreative Rights
Several commentators criticize both the importance and the scope that
I give to procreative choice. They challenge my claim that procreative
liberty is a fundamental right and my conclusion that respect for coital
conception strongly implies that noncoital reproduction is also protected.
Both Professor Gilbert Meilaender and Professor Laura Purdy assume
that I derive the right to procreate from the existence of the right to avoid
procreation,4 but tis assumption is maccurate. Although engaging m and
3. The encounter with my critics, however, has shown me several places where my
argument could have been clarified or deepened and a few organizational slips corrected. They
have also shown me how disputes over the scope of reproductive rights grow out of deeper
disputes about rights-based liberalism, the moral and political theory that undergirds this work.
4. See Gilbert Meilaender, Products of the Will: Robertson's Children of Choice, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REv 173, 173 (1995); Laura M. Purdy, Children of Choice: Whose
Children?At What Cost?, 52 WASH. &LEEL. REV 197, 205 (1995).
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avoiding procreation are two central aspects of procreative liberty, each
aspect "stands on its own bottom."5 Each is supported by a separate set of
interests connected with quite separate experiences of engaging m or
avoiding reproduction, and each has implications for different sets of
technologies - Norplant and RU486 have little in common with egg
donation and nucromanipulation of gametes.6
This point matters only because it directs our attention to the reasons for
giving priority to both aspects of procreative liberty In the book I argue
that procreative liberty deserves primacy because it is an important aspect of
self-determination and well-being.7 While some persons would hold that
autonomy or choice in itself is always a good, I focus on the particular set
of interests that make self-determination in reproductive matters so important
to the shape of an individual's life. In my view, reproductive choices have
such a major impact on a person's life - on one's identity, one's body, and
one's sense of meaning - that we are committed to assigning discretion over
them to the individuals directly involved, unless great harm to others from
the choice would ensue. The use of reproductive technology, such as
assisted noncoital reproduction or genetic screening, should thus be protected
if it closely relates to or implicates the interests and concerns that make those
decisions so fraught with personal importance.8
Professor Meilaender criticizes me for not giving a broader, overarch-
mg theory of which life decisions are central and inplies that there is no way
5. See Griswold v.Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(rejecting Justice Douglas's theory of penumbras and finding support for marital right to use
contraceptives m Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment, which ".stands on its
own bottom").
6. Professor Meilaender simply errs when he states that "[tihe desire not to reproduce
is more foundational m [Robertson's] argument." Meilaender, supra note 4, at 181. I
am also puzzled by Purdy's assertion that "Robertson sees the right not to reproduce and the
right to reproduce as two sides of the same com. From that fact, he seems to infer that the
strong right not to reproduce implies an equally strong right to reproduce " Purdy, supra
note 4, at 205. I make clear m the text that both the right to reproduce and the right not to
reproduce are protected aspects of procreative liberty supported by very different reasons and
with different implications. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 25-40.
7 See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 24-25.
8. Professor Purdy found rn my emphasis on the personal importance of reproducing
an implied duty on the part of women to reproduce that I surely did not intend. See Purdy,
supra note 4, at 199-200. It is true that many women feel an obligation to want children, thus
reinforcing the sexist identification of women with pregnancy and babies. See id. But I
clearly am emphasizing the freedom to reproduce or not as one chooses precisely because of
its great personal significance to women and men.
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to distinguish procreative choices from the many other choices that are
important to identity and dignity I But I am not offering a general moral or
legal theory for determning which personally significant choices deserve
special protection. Rather, I am drawing on widespread notions about the
unportance of procreative decisions generally to individuals and their life
plans, which is reflected widely in our practices and considered intuitions,
in order to show their iplications for a variety of issues that had not
previously been considered.
Of course, one could give a deeper and more theoretical account of why
procreative choice should be so protected. Such an account would stress the
importance of procreative liberty to individual happiness, autonomy, and
equality of opportunity 10 But surely the thinness or thickness of presentation
of underlying theory is not the issue. I doubt very much that the commenta-
tors would find that most procreation - for example, coital reproduction by
a married couple - is not prima facie important and deserving of special
respect precisely because of its role m defining our identity, dignity, and
humanity, though they rmght wish to deny some of the implications that such
a position would have for access to new reproductive technologies.
In the final analysis, one's view about the importance of procreative
liberty comes down to a normative judgment about the importance of
reproductive experience in people's lives. I believe that reproductive
decisions have such great significance for personal identity and happiness
that an important area of freedom and human dignity would be lost if one
lacked self-determination in procreation. Indeed, to deny the importance of
procreative liberty would be to grant the state repressive power over our
intimate lives in a most fundamental way, as recent experiences in China and
Romania have shown.I'
Putting the issue in this way helps us see that the critics' concern may
be less with the importance of procreative liberty per se, and more with the
implications that I claim such recognition has for a variety of reproductive
issues. Perhaps they fear that by valuing procreative liberty so highly up
front, they will be drawn into approving many practices that they find
9. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 178-80.
10. Two excellent unpublished papers by Dan Brock present such a theory See
generally Dan Brock, Funding New Reproductive Technologies: Should They Be Included in
a Basic Benefit Package?, in OOcYTE DONATION: ETHIcAL AND POLIcY ISSUES (Cynthia
Cohen ed., forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter Brock, Funding New Reproductive Technologies];
Dan Brock, Reproductive Freedom: Its Nature, Basis, and Limits (n.d.) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
11. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 25.
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offensive or harmful, particularly those involving donors, surrogates, and
genetic engineering. The possibility of such a result is heightened by the
stringency of the harm test for limiting procreative choices that a commit-
ment to procreative liberty entails.
If the critics are concerned about the potentially wide scope of a rights-
based approach to reproductive technology, questioning special protection
for procreative liberty is a rational strategy, for such protection provides a
method for determining whether a technological alternative to coital
reproduction should also be protected as an instance of procreative choice.
If one can show that enough of the same interests and values that are
involved m coital marital reproduction are significantly unplicated m
noncoital uses, then novel variations on the traditional coital model should
also be protected, for nearly all persons agree that coital reproduction, at
least among married couples, is a protected activity Much of Children of
Choice is an account of how most reproductive technologies facilitate having
or not having essential procreative experiences and thus deserve presumptive
protection as an exercise of procreative liberty
In any event, we are inevitably forced to deal with questions about the
nature and scope of procreative rights. 2 There is, of course, much room for
dispute and disagreement over what the essential or core aspects of
procreation are. I believe that my views are representative of a large
segment of the population, though of course some people may not share
them. In an important sense, we are constituting or creating our conception
of reproductive meaning in the very act of confronting these questions and
reaching a conclusion about their importance.
13
The main points of difference with the four commentators about the
scope of procreative liberty - other critics would raise other issues -
12. The fact that there may be disagreement and conflict about the periphery or
boundary of procreative liberty does not negate the importance of procreative liberty at the
core, where there is agreement. Situating boundaries is always contentious because relevant
interests are more weakly present, and thus their importance is more easily contested.
13. Such a process is evident in the ongoing evaluation of the genetic Connection as an
essential part of reproduction. At one level, it seems essential to the very meaning of
reproduction, even when totally separated from rearing. However, at some point, genetic
connection tout court loses its allure, and the experience of rearing dominates.
Thus Professor Meilaender is wrong when he states that my theory "requires no
biological tie to the offspring produced." Meilaender, supra note 4, at 175. I am very clear
that it does, though I do recognize in Chapter 6, at the end of a discussion of collaborative
reproduction, a loop back to our thinking about adoption. In that section, I note speculatively
the possible lessening of the importance of genetic connections, but do not recommend
immediate legal change. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 142-44.
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concern the shape and form of families: the importance of marriage for the
right to procreate, the propriety of collaborative reproduction, and, to a
lesser extent, genetic selection and cloning. It is significant that m a book
that discusses seven major technologies the critics pay close attention only
to those issues. 4 As a result, it appears that my critics are m favor of most
reproductive technologies, but have some doubts about issues most directly
implicating changes in the traditional family Even if they were correct
about these disputed family issues, a wide swath of procreative choice for
marital reproduction using novel reproductive techmques would remain.' 5
A. Marnage
I was surprised to see how important marriage is for all four
commentators. Professor Anne Massie and Dr. Howard Jones each argue
that procreative liberty should not necessarily extend to single persons. 6
Professor Meilaender writes eloquently about the importance of procreation
in marriage as an expression of the love and the telos that binds two
persons together. 17 Only Professor Purdy, a feminst who knows how
marriage requirements have oppressed women, is untroubled by such a
position, though she is concerned about some forms of collaborative
reproduction.'
The commentators make several claims about marriage and the new
reproduction that need to be separated. Sometimes, the concern is that
procreative liberty be confined to a married couple and not extended to
unmarried persons. At other times, the concern is that the use of donors
and surrogates violates the essence of procreation as an expression of
14. Professor Massie does address a few other issues, but she is also concerned with
these issues. See infra part I.D.
15. I am reminded of the old joke about whether a person who would have sex with
another for $1,000,000 but not $10 is a prostitute. In response to a protest that they are not
a prostitute, the response is "but we've already established that; we're just arguing about the
price." I believe that my critics have accepted the importance of procreative liberty and are
now "just arguing about price," for example, how far it extends. If so, they have granted me
the major premise of my argument.
16. See Howard W Jones, Jr., Comments on Children of Choice: Freedom and the New
Reproductive Technologies, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv 225, 229-30 (1995); Ann M. Massie,
Regulating Choice: A Constitutional Law Response to Professor John A. Robertson's Children
of Choice, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv 135, 161-62 (1995).
17 See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 187
18. See generally Purdy, supra note 4.
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marital unity, thus distinguishing it from mechanical "reproduction," which
does not issue from mutual love in marital union.19
With respect to the concern about the importance of procreation within
marriage, my critics appear to read Children of Choice as an argument for
recognizing the procreative liberty of unmarried persons as well, for
example, of single women or same sex couples having and rearing
offspring, or of men and women choosing to be sperm or egg donors or
surrogates with no intention of rearing the child. Indeed, Professor
Meilaender even assumes that I am ready to extend procreative liberty to
a lone impotent male who orchestrates a team of reproducers to bring him
a baby to rear.2'
There are several misunderstandings here about my position. With
respect to the importance of marriage as a minimal condition for the right
to procreate, whether fertile or infertile, coital or noncoital, I take no
strong position, though I do recognize the arguments in favor of an
extension of procreative rights to unmarried persons as well. I point out
that as a matter of positive law the United States Supreme Court has never
recognized a constitutional right to conceive if unmarried, though the Court
clearly would recognize the right of an unmarried pregnant woman to carry
a child to term.2 However one comes out on the constitutional question,
there is no question either legally or morally that a procreative liberty
interest is implicated in unmarried reproduction. Surely the absence of a
spouse does not mean that a person's wish to reproduce and rear alone or
with an unmarried partner of either sex is not procreative. Whether
nonmarital procreation is as important as marital procreation, whether it
should be constitutionally protected, and whether it poses such great harm
that it can be restricted to a greater extent are entirely separate questions.
By contrast, the farthest extensions of single parenthood would also
quite clearly seem not to be instances of procreative liberty, at least as we
now understand it. Thus Professor Meilaender's nightmare vision that
19. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 187-88.
20. See id. at 176 ("Whatever some people do, using the current panoply of techniques,
to produce a child that one or more of them will rear seems presumptively protected by the
right of reproductive liberty as Robertson understands it.").
21. The right of an unmarried pregnant woman not to be forced to abort a pregnancy just
because she is unmarried is a clear implication of the right to avoid reproduction recognized
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Roe v
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and of the right to reproduce recognized in Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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respect for procreative liberty would protect the right of a single man or
woman to orchestrate the conception, gestation, and birth of a child for that
person to rear or allocate to others to rear is simply wrong.' Such an
enterprise should not now be protected as part of procreative liberty
because it is so far from our present understandings of why reproduction
is valuable and protected. Our present understandings view procreation as
something more than a means to obtain children for rearing. A similar
argument can be made that gamete donors or surrogates do not have an
independent procreative right to be a donor or surrogate, though they may
have such a right derived from an infertile couple's need for their
services.2
3
In any event, if marriage is the main concern, the commentators are
in fact ceding a great deal of scope to my claims for procreative liberty
because most of the reproductive techniques argued for, including
postmenopausal egg donation, clomng by blastomere separation, and
freezing embryos, involve married couples and not single persons or third
party collaborators.24
B. Collaborative Reproduction
Several of my critics also reject my inclusion of collaborative
reproduction as an aspect of procreative liberty Professor Meilaender, for
example, asserts that "many of the considerations Robertson mentions
as reasons for the importance of reproductive experience are not involved
in" donor insemination, one of the most common forms of collaborative
reproduction.' Meilaender and others have difficulty seeing how
surrogacy fits in; even if they did see the fit, they might still reject
22. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 176; supra note 20. For example, my theory of
procreative liberty would not necessarily give a single man the right to hire a surrogate to
provide him with a child, even though a married couple would have such a right.
23. The donor or surrogate will have a biologic or genetic connection with offspring,
but if this connection is all, then it may be insufficient to count as a core procreative
experience, even though it clearly is procreative.
24. Only Professor Meilaender seems to be concerned about the noncoital aspect of these
technologies. His long paean to the importance of marriage sometimes sounds as if he regards
sexual union as equally important as marriage for "procreation," as opposed to "reproduc-
tion," to occur. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 187-88. However, Meilaender never
explicitly states this concern and quickly turns to discussions of topics that are consistent with
accepting noncoital conception within a marriage.
25. Id. at 179.
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surrogacy as inconsistent with an essentialist conception of marriage or
because of its other harmful effects.
But the closeness of collaborative reproduction to accepted and revered
desires to form families should be clear. The use of a donor or surrogate
is as much aprojetparentale as coital reproduction. Infertile couples have
the same needs and desires to have and rear offspring as fertile couples.
If collaborative assistance will ensure that an infertile couple will raise a
child who is biologically related to both, as occurs m gestational surrogacy
and egg donation, then the fact that one component of the procreative
trinity of genes, gestation, and rearing is missing would not seem to
diminsh collaboration's importance as a core procreative choice.26 This
conclusion also applies when the resulting child is genetically or gestation-
ally related to at least one member of the rearing couple, as occurs in
donor insemination, embryo donation, and surrogacy Of course,
considerable argument and discussion may be needed to see these
connections, and some persons may never be convinced that a particular
procedure is acceptable.27 But it is clear that persons using collaborative
means are as fully engaged in a procreative enterprise as are couples who
conceive coitally or couples who undergo medically assisted insemination
or in vitro fertilization (IVF) with their own gametes. Indeed, the frequent
use of donor sperm by mramed couples (over 30,000 couples a year have
children in this way)' shows that sperm donation fits easily within our
ordinary conceptions of reproduction within marriage and would extend to
unmarried persons if their freedom to procreate were also recognized. If
so, other collaborative procedures should be respected as well.2 9
26. Consider egg donation. The infertile couple will have and rear a child who is the
genetic child of the husband and the gestational child of the wife. This process is very close
to coital reproduction - only the female genetic tie is missing. Surely the fact that another
woman provided the egg, thus breaking the usual genetic connection with reproduction, does
not prevent the infertile couple from regarding themselves as having procreated. Egg donation
should therefore be protected as part of procreative liberty.
27 I agree with Professor Purdy that in-depth, case-specific analysis is essential to
understand or resolve contested issues, and I attempted to provide it for the seven technologies
discussed in the book.
28. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION:
PRAcrIcE IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (1988).
29. Professor Meilaender has noted an organizational error at the beginning of Chapter
6 of Children of Choice. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 174-75. The chapter starts with
a brief argument for why collaboration is a central part of procreative liberty but then poses
several questions that are discussed in Chapter 2. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 119-20.
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C. The Implications of Method
In answering questions about the scope and boundaries of procreative
liberty, we must, as I have noted, pay careful attention to the values and
interests underlying reproductive experiences. By focusing on the values and
interests that give reproduction its great significance to individuals, we
determine whether new situations involve those interests to a sufficient
degree to merit support and respect as an exercise of procreative liberty
One's views on whether a new situation implicates procreative liberty will
necessarily reveal or define a person's conception of what is central to
reproduction and why
In a pluralistic society, there will be wide areas of agreement and
disagreement. Just as everyone will agree that nearly all consensual marital
coital reproduction partakes of procreative liberty, nearly everyone will also
agree that cloning or intentional diminishment does not share in those values
and, therefore, deserves no respect because it is procreative." The
blurriness of the outer boundary does not negate the existence of a core of
clearly procreative experience that reasonably extends to some use of donors
and surrogates. Professor Meilaender argues that I cannot reconcile those
limits with what I have previously said about the importance of the
procreative experience, 31 but it is precisely the absence of what makes
procreative experiences so valued in cloning and intentional diminishment
that places them outside procreative liberty's protections. A similar
argument can be made about posthumous reproduction. A decision to have
gametes or embryos used after one's death - the paradigm case of
posthumous reproduction - is too far removed from the experiences and
interests that give reproduction its value to deserve respect in its own right.
Accordingly, posthumous reproduction may be accorded less protection than
Meilaender is correct in noting that I never then explicitly answer m Chapter 6 the questions
raised at the beginning of that chapter, thus leaving him wondering where the argument is.
See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 175. I should have at that point restated the arguments made
m Chapter 2 for protecting collaborative reproduction as part of procreative liberty, or at least
referred the reader to them. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 39-40.
30. As I note in my discussion of clomng m Chapter 7, cloning may be protected on
some other ground, such as the right to rear and educate one's offspring. See ROBERTSON,
supra note 1, at 166-67
31. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 176-77 Professor Meilaender states: "His appeal
here to actions that 'deviate too far from the experiences that make reproduction a valued
experience' is a last-ditch attempt to find limits to a freedom that no longer presupposes any
natural substratum " Id. at 177
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reproduction that will occur during one's life. 2
Contrary to Professor Meilaender's characterization of my position, this
same approach would now exclude as a procreative experience a situation in
wluch the person orchestrating the collaborative reproductive effort has no
biologic tie to the child and may never rear it. Until our widely shared
conceptions about what makes reproduction valued change, that brokering
experience might not qualify as a form of protected procreation because
there is no biologic tie to the person (or partner, for none exists) claiming the
liberty Even if the person orchestrating the effort intended to rear the child,
the reproduction still would not qualify as a valued procreative experience
under current conceptions of procreation. Of course, it may be that the
importance of rearing a child is so central to personal identity and meaning
that it too should be protected as a fundamental liberty But it would be
difficult to argue that such a liberty is procreative, at least under current
conceptions of procreation. With time, however, those conceptions could
change or evolve to include that situation, for some of the same interests
implicated in the distinctly procreative experience, for example, the
connection with rearing, are present there as well.
Professor Meilaender also mistakenly believes that I argue that an egg
or sperm donor who has no intention or wish to be involved in rearing has
as much a right to procreate as a married couple.33 However, I only claim
that the donor's experience is a reproductive one. Whether it is worthy of
protection in itself depends on how central or important we think that genetic
reproduction tout court is. In Chapter 5 of Children of Choice, I discuss
mandatory embryo donation as an alternative to embryo discard. 4 I argue
that genetic connection without more - reproduction tout court - is not a
protected aspect of procreative liberty because it is insufficiently involved
with the values and interests that make procreation valuable to us. 35 The act
of donation, however, though not independently protected in the donor's
own right, might deserve derivative respect because it is essential for
infertile couples, who are partaking of a core reproductive experience, to
have access to donations.
32. Posthumous use of frozen sperm or embryos might be protected, however, as an
aspect of a surviving spouse's procreative freedom. For a more complete discussion of
posthumous reproduction written after Children of Choice, see generally John A. Robertson,
Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027 (1994).
33. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 179.
34. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 108.
35. See id. at 108-09.
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 233 (1995)
Of course, because of Ins essentialist, deontologic views about marriage
and sexual union as the only morally acceptable path to procreation,
Professor Meilaender sometimes writes as if no argument could convince
him. If he in fact is taking this stark a position, which is akin to the
Catholic Church's requirement that the procreative always be tied to the
unitive, then he should be against IVF, artificial insemination with husband
sperm, and other reproductive techniques that enable married couples to
procreate. He may oppose such practices for deontic or even consequen-
tialist reasons, but it is difficult to argue that the married couple using
noncoital means to treat infertility is not involved in procreation. If, on the
other hand, Meilaender is prepared to accept noncoital technologies that
involve the gametes of husband and wife even though he opposes the use of
donors and surrogates, then we have a basis for dialogue. We can discuss
the extent to which the interests and values that underlie marital procreation
exist when a married couple seeks the collaborative assistance of a donor or
surrogate and perhaps reach agreement.
D Constitutional Status
Professor Massie raises two other objections to the existence or scope
of rights of procreative liberty claimed in Children of Choice. One concerns
the potential for limiting public debate before all the implications of a
practice have become known. The other questions whether reproductive
practices should be constitutionally protected sinply because of beliefs about
their personal importance.
Professor Massie makes the point about foreclosing public debate by
citing four controversial issues - access of HIV patients to IVF; postmeno-
pausal egg donation; access of singles, gays, and lesbians to IVF; and
surrogacy for convemence - "that might seem ripe for public debate, but
that would be virtually foreclosed to discussion if [my] views of constitu-
tional analysis prevailed."36 In her view, granting these choices constitu-
tional status precludes regulation that an emerging public consensus might
find desirable.37 In essence, "[t]he conversation is over before it has had a
chance to begin."38
This criticism seriously misunderstands the effect of a rights-based
approach to public policy for new reproductive technologies. Rather than
36. See Massie, supra note 16, at 141; see id. at 141-44.
37 See id. at 144.
38. Id.
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foreclosing discussion, a recognition of procreative liberty as a right
structures discussion in a way that ultimately enriches consideration of public
policy for the technology m question. A rights-based approach begins by
asking whether a strong procreative interest is implicated m the practice and,
if it is, whether the governmental action or policy at issue infringes it. If so,
a rights-based approach then looks at what the alleged harm from the
procedure is and asks whether that harm is sufficient to justify overriding or
infringing the procreative interests at stake. Rather than ending or
foreclosing discussion, this approach makes sure that all relevant factors are
considered, and prevents one from making policy on unanalyzed intuitive
reactions.
This method may be illustrated with Professor Massie's claim that there
would be no basis for a public discussion of whether postmenopausal
pregnancy through egg donation should be permitted.39 Whether a fifty-five
year old woman has a constitutional right to gestate and to rear offspring
conceived with a donor egg and her husband's sperm would depend first
upon a showing that a significant procreative interest is involved m the
practice. In making that assessment, one would have to examine the extent
to which male reproduction at the same age would be protected and whether
female reproduction is so different that the natural age of menopause should
be a social barrier to the use of technology that would overcome the physical
barrier to pregnancy
A finding that significant procreative interests are involved, however,
would not end the matter. The opponents of the practice could still show
that the harms to children or others from the practice of postmenopausal egg
donation were so severe that the practice could be justifiably limited.
Because children sometimes have elderly fathers or are raised by grandmoth-
ers, it may be difficult to show that such serious harm to children would
arise from the practice that overriding the postmenopausal woman's
procreative interest would be justified.
In the end, one might conclude that postmenopausal egg donation does
fall within the ambit of protected procreative liberty, but one reaches that
conclusion only after a thorough discussion about the importance of
reproduction to older women, comparisons to male reproduction, and an
assessment of the harms that such a practice is said to cause. Rather than
ending or foreclosing discussion, the method of procreative liberty defended
in Children of Choice opens up and enriches a discussion that might have
been foreclosed by an initial visceral reaction about the oddity of pregnancy
39. See id. at 142-44.
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in older *women. Similar discussions and analyses would also occur in
subjecting Professor Massie's other examples to the evaluative procedures
entailed by a presumptive respect for procreative liberty
Professor Massie's second criticism is that the right to procreate lacks
the constitutional status that I accord it because of a distinction between
beliefs and conduct in constitutional law 4I While beliefs are protected,
conduct often is not. Massie clamis that my argument that procreative
practices are constitutionally protected because of the beliefs that individuals
have of their importance ignores the way m which many forms of conduct
based on protected constitutional beliefs are subject to restriction. To
support this argument, she cites the validity of state restrictions that affect
religious practices and the time, place, and manner of speech.4'
But my argument for the constitutional status of new reproductive
practices is not based on the claim that conduct based on important personal
beliefs must always be constitutionally protected. Rather, it is an argument
that the conduct based on these particular beliefs should be protected, not
because they are beliefs, but because they are beliefs of a certain kind.
Indeed, beliefs about the importance of having offspring are so important
that coital reproduction by married couples is constitutionally protected,
precisely because of the meanings that coital reproduction has for mdividu-
als. But if that point is so, then noncoital reproduction should also be
presumptively protected because it involves conduct that arrives at the same
results that coital reproduction does. If conduct based on beliefs m the case
of coital reproduction is protected, then conduct in the case of noncoital
reproduction should also be protected.
To strengthen her argument, Professor Massie makes a somewhat
different point. She cites cases that involve privacy rights in conduct and
claims that they "invariably implicate not only the value of self-fulfillment
or self-definition but one or more other values as well [such as] respect
for an individual's bodily integrity or social concerns related to the
privacy of marital intimacy and the integrity of the family unit."42 Massie
then argues that assisted reproduction, unlike coital reproduction, does not
directly implicate these other values and, therefore, should not be smailarly
protected.43 She concludes: "Heightened protection is not triggered simply
by the fact that any particular conduct represents a search for meaning in life
40. See id. at 153-62 (discussing distinction between beliefs and conduct).
41. See id. at 154-58.
42. Id. at 159.
43. See id. at 162.
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or because the persons involved are seeking self-fulfillment central to their
self-definition.""
Professor Massie is correct that all conduct related to a search for self-
fulfillment is not automatically protected, but she misapplies this principle
to noncoital techniques of treating infertility Again, it is not the search for
self-fulfillment alone that deserves protection, but the particular land of self-
fulfillment at issue. Having recognized that self-fulfillment through coital
reproduction is protected, there is no basis for excluding the same experience
of self-fulfillment for infertile couples. Although they conceive noncoitally,
they seek the same experiences of marital intimacy and family integrity that
are involved in coital reproduction. If coital reproduction qualifies for
constitutional protection, then noncoital reproduction should as well.45
I. Infrngement
Beyond questioning the scope and derivation of a right of procreative
liberty, my critics have concentrated for the most part on my allegedly
overly narrow conception of harm. Before addressing that point, however,
it is useful to remember that an intermediate step of analysis exists that
becomes important in many questions of public policy I
The significance of establishing that decisions to use noncoital
reproductive techniques involve procreative liberty is that it places the
burden on the government or party seeking to interfere with that choice to
show that its action is justified by the great harm that the use of the
technology in question would cause. But this burden of proof arises only if
the state or third party has in fact interfered with or infringed the exercise of
procreative choice. The mere failure to facilitate or not encourage the
44. See id.
45. Professor Massie's point about the involvement of bodily integrity is drawn from
abortion cases in which restrictions on abortion may be seen as intruding on a pregnant
woman's bodily integrity See id. at 159 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). A right to engage in coital reproduction
does not involve bodily integrity in that sense (unless the state sought to require abortion or
sterilization), though it clearly involves voluntary use of the body But assisted reproductive
techniques also involve a voluntary use of the body, though in a somewhat different way
46. Professor Meilaender does note a problem here, but does not pursue it. See
Meilaender, supra note 4, at 180-81. Both Professor Meilaender and Professor Purdy raise
questions about negative and positive rights, which are relevant to the issue of insurance
funding discussed below. See id., Purdy, supra note 4, at 204; nfra part IV.C. They argue
that it is inconsistent to give procreative liberty high status and then fail to fund it. As a moral
matter, I am now convinced that they are right. See infra part IV.C.
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choice would not amount to infringement. Questions about whether
governmental actions meant to discourage the use of noncoital techniques
constitute an infringement of the right, thus casting the burden on the state
to prove a compelling need or harm, will also arise and be heatedly
contested. Resolution of those questions will usually implicate the same
values and interests that drive other disputes about the reach of procreative
rights. 47
III. Harm
A major critique by Professor Purdy and Professor Meilaender is that
my conception of harm is too narrow I This view is a key challenge to my
analysis because, although I argue strenuously that procreative choice should
be protected as a fundamental right, my claim is for presumptive and not
absolute protection. The clear implication is that procreative liberty need not
be respected m all circumstances. Uses of reproductive technology that
cause harm - that violate the harm principle - can be stopped and, indeed,
should be stopped. What counts as harm sufficient to justify overriding
procreative choice is thus crucial. According to Purdy and Meilaender, what
I grant with one hand - that procreative liberty is not absolute - I take
away with the other by almost never recogmzmg any effect or consequence
as sufficient harm to justify limiting the use of a new technology 49 What
they see as significant harm never shows on my radar screen and thus is
never entered into the balance.
Their eloquent attack on my conception of harm cuts to the heart of the
liberal rights-based approaches to human action that informs Children of
Choice. Liberalism glorifies will and choice. As Annette Baier has put it,
liberalism is a morality of obligation and not a morality of care and trust.5 0
In its emphasis on will and choice, liberalism looks only at the present choice
47 See infra part IV (discussing infrastructure, regulation, and insurance funding). The
main issues of infringement concern enforcing preconception donor and surrogate agreements,
paying donors and surrogates for their services, paying donor and surrogate brokers, and
publicly funding infertility services.
48. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 173-74, 192-95; Purdy, supra note 4, at 218-20, 223.
49. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 173-74, 192-95; Purdy, supra note 4, at 219-20.
One instance of permissible restriction based on harm that I do recognize appears m my
discussion of secrecy and confidentiality of gamete donors and surrogates. I recognize there
the interests of children in having information about their progenitors as a compelling interest
that would overrde the collaborators' interests in privacy See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at
123-25.
50. See ANNErr C. BAIER, MORALPREjUDICES: ESSAYS IN ETHnCS 3-12, 14-16 (1994).
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or act of will and slights larger social and systemic effects. The tradition of
classical liberalism on which my argument draws also ignores the importance
of deontic violations. Such moralisms, or "mere symbolic effects" as I term
them, carry little weight in opposition to the individual's act of will in
exercising fundamental liberty 51
Children of Choice clearly derives from the classical liberal tradition
and, of course, will be wanting to the extent that liberalism itself is wanting.
At the most fundamental level, the question of the scope of harm concerns
the extent to which the state may use its power to impose constitutive or
deontic norms on its citizens.' The liberal tradition limiting state power has
arguably benefited us all, as our rights to have this discussion and to exercise
other basic rights show Yet others would disagree, or at least would draw
the line between public and private authority differently Public policy
questions about the freedom to use reproductive technologies is another
arena for confronting fundamental issues of liberalism, for it confronts us
directly with varying conceptions of the value of reproductive freedom and
the normative assessments that would limit that liberty
In the end, disputes over the scope of reproductive freedom, as well as
disputes over liberalism itself, may best be resolved by inclusion rather than
exclusion of competing perspectives. Liberal rights are necessary but not
sufficient because they give too little attention to, indeed, often appear to
ignore, the real and equally crucial moral norms that Professor Meilaender
and others raise. The constitutive and the symbolic norms cannot be
suppressed, even if we limit their role in public definition of rights. Thus,
it is necessary to supplement a liberal morality of will and obligation with a
morality or ethic of trust and care.
It is essential to recogize that fidelity to liberal rights and freedom is
not inconsistent with a morality of trust and care. The two can coexist and,
in a crucial sense, need each other, as the case of reproductive rights
illustrates. Without the warm nurturance of care and trust, the liberal rights-
based approach stands naked and-cold in the anomic wind, like a figure in
an Odd Nerdrum painting.5" Yet warmth and trust need the foundation of
liberal rights if they are to thrive.
51. Such moralisms may provide a rational basis for governmental or individual action,
but they are insufficient to override the fundamental liberty of individuals in cases of conflict.
52. This question is the core issue that separates Professor Meilaender and me.
53. The paintings of Odd Nerdrun, a contemporary Norwegian artist, usually depict
lone or small groups of lanky, naked men m desolate landscapes devoid of warmth or even
vegetation.
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This central insight, which is drawn from feminist thought, should then
guide our analysis of new reproductive technologies. The use of novel
reproductive practices need moral guidelines rooted m trust and care. The
legal protection that is constitutionally accorded procreative choices may
well permit more activities than such a morality would, but that situation is
the inevitable price of legal protection of individual rights. The challenge
will be to develop a morality of care and trust for reproductive technologies
without infrngmg rights, a recurring issue in liberal democracies.
It is then possible to agree with Professor Purdy about systemic
consequences for women and with Professor Meilaender about the npor-
tance of constitutive and symbolic norms without relinquishing a strong
commitment to procreative liberty 51 As I will show after a discussion of
their views of harm, their concerns should be reflected in regulation and in
the codes of ethics and actual practices that develop in the use of these
techniques, not m the use of law to ban or condemn them.
A. Consequentialist Harms
Professor Purdy and Professor Meilaender challenge my concept of
harm as too narrow on both consequentialist and deontic grounds.' The
main consequentialist criticism is from Purdy, who argues that I inappropri-
ately leave out of the balance the harm to children and women that use of
these techniques inevitably brings. 56
1 Harm to Children
Professor Massie and Professor Purdy argue that I am too accepting of
new technologies in part because I ignore their effect on resulting children.'
Professor Meilaender's concern that the child born of assisted reproduction
will not be viewed as "equal in dignity to those who make it" also expresses
this concern. 58
54. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 192-95; Purdy, supra note 4, at 206.
55. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 173-74, 192-95; Purdy, supra note 4, at 218-20,
223.
56. See Purdy, supra note 4, at 202-03, 206, 218.
57 See Massie, supra note 16, at 137-40, 164-70; Purdy, supra note 4, at 202-03.
58. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 195. Professor Meilaender states:
We must think of the body as the locus of personal presence in order to discern
the equal worth of the child who springs from the embrace of our bodies. There
are countless ways to "have" a child. Not all of them will teach us to
discern the equal humanity of the child as one who is not our product, but,
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As Professor Purdy correctly notes, a central feature of my analysis of
harm is the claim that the offspring of new reproductive technologies are
almost never harmed because of the means of their conception. 9 Because
being the child of assisted reproduction, whatever its psychological and
social sequelae, is not a fate worse than death, hence not a wrongful life, the
use of the technique that made their births possible cannot be harmful to
them.1° But for the use of the technique at issue, they never would have
come into existence. If this argument is correct, then a large class of moral
concerns about new reproductive technologies vanish.
It is Important to understand precisely what my argument about the lack
of harm to children does. Professor Purdy, like others who have disagreed
with me on this point, not only deies this premise but also assumes that I
believe that impact on children is always irrelevant to moral or policy
assessment.6 My point is that concern about offspring for their own sake is
not a sufficient basis for interfering with procreative choice because no harm
can be shown to those who would not be born but for the very technique in
question.62
Such births, however, precisely because of the technological means
involved, may affect others. If the impact on others is sufficient, then it
could be a basis for limiting procreative choice. The burden would be on
those who seek to limit procreative freedom on this ground to show both that
children are born generally less well-off in some significant way (an
empirical clain that may be hard to establish) and that such state of affairs
constitutes a serious harm because of either the moral offense that they feel
at such a child's existence or the additional costs that its birth entails for
others. In my view, it will be very difficult to meet those requirements. 6
rather, the natural development of shared love, like us m dignity
Id. at 191-92. He also states that "if we seek to do more, we fundamentally alter the nature
of what we are doing - and of the beings to whom we give rise." Id. at 192.
59. See Purdy, supra note 4, at 201.
60. Professor Purdy incorrectly states that my position is derived from Derek Parfit's
views in Reasons and Persons. See id. at 201 & n. 11; see generally DEREK PARFrr, REASONS
AND PERSONS (1984). While I have learned much from Derek Parfit, my views on this point
were formed before I was aware of his work.
61. See Purdy, supra note 4, at 201.
62. Data and studies are admittedly sparse, but there does not appear to be a higher rate
of suicide or psychosocial problems among offspring of collaborative reproduction. See R.
SNOWDEN ET AL., ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION: A SOCIAL INVESTIGATION 50-54, 71-82, 97-
104 (1983).
63. This argument would have little weight where the couple pays the medical and
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Thus impact on others of a birth which is not itself wrongful to the born
child will rarely be strong enough to justify infringing core procreative
interests.64
2. Harm to Women
Professor Purdy also argues that my conception of harm is too narrow
because it ignores wider systemic effects of these techniques on women. 65
Purdy seems ready to accept any use of technology as long as the conse-
quences, particularly for women,' are shown to be positive. However, she
finds that the effects are much more pernicious than I recognize and that, if
taken into account, they would require that the scope of procreative liberty
be considerably smaller than I would allow 67
Professor Purdy is making a key move m feminist methodology She
is asking the "woman question" - how does a rights-based approach to new
reproductive technologies affect women. 61 For her, the key inquiry is
whether the use of these techniques helps or hurts women. 69 Asking this
question will often focus attention on effects and consequences that standard
approaches to identifying harm tend to overlook. She concludes that a
rights-based approach to procreative liberty overlooks three major ways m
rearing costs of the offspring who are damaged or handicapped because of a reproductive
technology But even if they did not, the question would be whether the resulting costs are
greater than with other kinds of reproduction that society permits or fosters. It would be hard
to show that the costs of rearing children born through assisted reproduction impose such great
costs on others that it wrongs those persons who bear those costs to allow such births to occur.
64. For example, being conceived or born with the help of lVF or of a donor or
surrogate is unlikely to be a disability under the Americans With Disabilities Act, which
defines disability as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993).
65. See Purdy, supra note 4, at 206-11.
66. Because Professor Purdy did not discuss other effects, one does not know her
position on this point.
67 See Purdy, supra note 4, at 214. It is not clear, however, whether Professor Purdy's
concerns would lead to prohibition of the use of certain techniques, or only to regulation of
these techniques. As I discuss below, regulations which would meet most of her concerns are
consistent with respect for procreative liberty and thus may be enacted without limiting access
to most new reproductive techmques. See infra part IV.B.
68. SeeKatharineT. Bartlett, Femmut Legal Methods, 103 HARv L. REv 829, 837-49
(1990) (discussing "woman question").
69. See Purdy, supra note 4, at 197-99.
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which new reproductive techniques harm women.70
I agree with Professor Purdy that asking the "woman question" is
essential to evaluate fully the impact of the new technologies, but I disagree
with her conclusions that answers to the "woman question" would drastically
shrink the scope of procreative liberty Indeed, many of Purdy's concerns
arise from her fears about how women would use their freedom of procre-
ative choice. Unless I am misreading the policy implications of her critique,
she, in the name of protection of women, would drastically limit the choices
that are available to women."
Professor Purdy focuses on three "feminist womes. "I The first is that
techniques that "start out as new options come to be accepted as the standard
of care, which women are not really free to refuse. "I This pattern both
deprives women of their choice of whether to use the technique and subjects
them to the risks and harms that the techniques carry I This result is of
course a real world danger that arises with many medical procedures. The
problem may be especially acute for less educated women who, if they are
offered the technique at all, may have more trouble saying no. In fact, the
evidence shows that women have more choice in these matters than Purdy
acknowledges and that many women routinely refuse prenatal serum
screening as well as ammocentesis.75 Regulation to assure informed consent
and to prevent premature routinization of new procedures may well be in
order. However, the danger that Purdy notes hardly justifies depriving all
women of the right to choose these techniques to realize procreative goals.
Professor Purdy's second problem with my treatment of procreative
choice "is that a woman may choose an option that is not necessarily in her
70. See id. at 207
71. See id. at 223. Professor Purdy may be drawing attention to these issues only so that
preventive policies may be adopted, and thus she might not support prohibition. As I argue
below, many of her concerns could be met through regulation without limiting the scope of
procreative choice. See infra part IV.B.
72. See Purdy, supra note 4, at 207
73. Id. However, Professor Purdy cites only the use of electronic fetal monitoring and
ultrasound and does not give an example based on any of the technologies that I discuss in the
book. See id. at 207 & n.31. Because many other commentators have been specific, for
example, citing the routinization of amniocentesis, her points still hold and deserve an answer.
74. See id. at 207
75. See Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, A Critique of Some Feminist Challenges
to PrenatalDiagnosis, 2 J. WOMEN'S HEALTH 173, 183 (1993) (concluding that some women
"refuse prenatal diagnosis"). In my own experience with this issue, I know two professional
women in their thirties who refused such tests and surprised their doctors in the process.
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interest" because of biased or incomplete information from providers and
the racial, class, and age characteristics of the individual making the
decision.76 Again, this danger is a real problem in many medical settings
other than reproduction. It is a problem that regulation should address, but
it hardly justifies a ban on choice altogether.
Professor Purdy's third problem is "that an option may benefit a
particular woman, but harm other women or harm women as a class."I
Purdy's concern here is exploitation of one woman by another, as she
thinks might occur m surrogacy, or that a new technique such as IVF "may
function like a safety valve that takes the pressure off individual women,
but deflects attention from serious underlying social problems."' Of
course, assisted reproductive techniques could lead to exploitation of
patients by providers and of donors and surrogates by patients or vice
versa. Treating infertility with IVF may also divert attention from the
causes of infertility or from the sexist attitudes that identify women with
gestational reproduction. But none of these fears is sufficient to limit the
choice of individuals and couples who seek to use a new technique to
procreate.
Although Professor Purdy's concerns are not sufficient to limit
procreative freedom, they do make a good case for regulation to nimmze
exploitation and to ensure that users are fully informed of success rates,
risk factors, and costs. I thought that I had made that point clearly in the
book, with respect to both the IVF industry and the recruitment of donors
and surrogates, but there is no harm in reiterating it.79 In the end, even
Purdy acknowledges the dilemma that would arise if women's procreative
freedom were limited because of concerns that women cannot choose
wisely I Her ultimate point is that high-tech approaches to infertility like
IVF should be discouraged rather than encouraged."' As I show in Part V,
such an approach does not necessarily negate or deny strong respect for
procreative liberty Indeed, this approach is an important way to combine
a morality of will and obligation with a morality of trust and care.
76. Purdy, supra note 4, at 208.
77 Id. at 209.
78. Id.
79. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 114-17, 136-39.
80. See Purdy, supra note 4, at 208-09.
81. See id. at 212-13.
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B. Moralisms and Symbolic Effects
For Professor Meilaender, my conception of harm is dangerously
narrow because it does not give symbolic and constitutive interests their
due. Symbolic or constitutive harms arise when an action or practice
violates norms, principles, or rules of right behavior without also causing
tangible harm to the interests or liberty of others, or contravenes essen-
tialist understandings of important life activities, such as reproduction,
marriage, family, or motherhood. The symbolic harm is felt by persons
who hold these conceptions dear. They feel wronged or aggrieved when
their conceptions of the right in these activities are not followed by others
or enshrined in public policy-
Professor Meilaender sternly criticizes me for discounting or ignoring
two major sources of ethical or normative value. Meilaender's first
concern is the status of fetuses and embryos, but he never fully engages my
arguments for valuing nonsentient fetuses and embryos as symbols rather
than as moral subjects in their own right, an essential feature of my
analysis.R Other than raising some questions about the precise basis of the
right to terminate pregnancy, his ultimate position on a range of issues
involving embryos and fetuses is left unclear, thus leaving little room for
further dialogue. 3
Professor Meilaender's second major concern is that noncoital means
of conception and the use of donors and surrogates to treat infertility
violates essential understandings of procreation and marriage as a joint
teleologic enterprise that promotes human dignity 81 His concerns here
appear to be largely deonotological, for he does not cite the harms or
82. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 102L03.
83. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 182-85. Professor Meilaender correctly notes that
my reasons for a right to terminate pregnancy could be more clearly stated. However, he errs
in stating that, if I rest on a Thomsoman, bodily intrusion justification and not on a right to
avoid procreation per se, then there would be no right to cause the death of embryos and
fetuses outside of the body. See id. at 183-84. This conclusion does not follow. When there
is an actual pregnancy, then bodily burdens play a role m the analysis that is missing when
there is no pregnancy. One reason why women should have the right to avoid conception, and
pregnancy when conception occurs, is precisely because of the bodily burdens involved m
pregnancy. I also disagree that Judith Thomson's stimulating hypotheticals m her famous
article symbolically beg the question. See generally Gilbert Meilaender, The Fetus as Parasite
and Mushroom: Judith Jarvis Thomson's Defense of Abortion, 46 LINACRE Q. 126 (1979).
84. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 186-88.
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disutilities to women and offspring that concern Professor Purdy, Professor
Massie, and other critics of these techniques. Rather, his concern is with
my emphasis on "making" rather than "doing."' He attributes to me a
very "thin understanding" of human value and claims that my emphasis on
will and rights denies the importance of embedded human relations in
essential institutions like marriage and the family 86
In posing these criticisms, Professor Meilaender is confronting one of
the fundamental problems of liberalism. If liberty is to be respected when
there is no tangible harm, then people may act in ways that conflict with
or offend the conceptions that other persons hold about the practice or
action in question. To resolve this problem adequately, one would have to
revisit the larger philosophical and religious allegiances that are at stake.
Rather than rehearse that larger issue, let me restate the case for
finding that deontologic or symbolic harms are insufficient to override
basic moral and legal rights. Contrary to Professor Meilaender's claims,
I do not deny the importance, indeed, the necessity, of symbols. s7 I like
my symbols as much as the next person, for they help me to define and
communicate through my choices and commitments who I am. Our lives,
of course, would be thin and desiccated if we lacked, or were powerless to
use, symbols because no symbolic communication, including language
itself, would be possible.
Thus Professor Meilaender is missing an important point by accusing
me of denying the importance of symbols. He should be addressing the
question of the role that one person's symbolic allegiances might properly
play in a liberal, pluralistic democracy, not the question of whether
symbols themselves are important. The essential question is~whether an
individual's or group's particular definition or creation of the good through
symbols should be mposed on others. However, precisely because
symbolic conceptions are self-defining and detached from the tangible
interests of others, liberalism commits us to leaving these matters to
individual choice.8" No group or community view of symbolic goods
85. See d. at 189-92.
86. See id. at 185-88.
87 See id. at 194 ("If we think of them as 'mere' symbols, we cut ourselves off from
much that is most important m the life of human beings who are, after all, the symbol-making
animals.").
88. See generally RONALD DwORKIN, LiFE's DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993) (discussing detached and
derivative interests in human life); John A. Robertson, Autonomy's Dominion: Dworkin on
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unrelated to such tangible interests may therefore justly intrude on different
individual symbolic choices about the good, though they may be acknowl-
edged and supported in other ways, and respected as an individual's
fundamental choice.8 9 It is this tolerance over different symbolic concep-
tions of the good that is at the heart of liberalism. If each is free to choose
and live his own life plan, then symbolic conceptions of what gives life
meaning must remain free of community imposition so that individuals are
free to choose their own symbolic commitments and constitutive practices.
Although directed at me, Professor Meilaender's criticism should be
aimed equally at John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and
others whose political and intellectual struggles have created the liberal
rights tradition that undergirds my analysis. Precisely because symbols are
crucial to our personal identity, one person's or group's conception of the
symbolic meaning of reproductive acts and practices should not constrain
the reproductive commitments and self-definitions of others.
Professor Meilaender is thus free to view assisted reproductive
technologies as his own constitutive, symbolic views of the good (rooted
in a Christian view of meaning and value) dictate. But it does not follow
that he should be free to limit the procreative freedom of others on the
basis of those views. The symbolic or constitutive concerns of one
segment or even the majority of a liberal community are insufficient to
override the fundamental liberties of all members of the communty
Showing what "doing comes to" in reproduction and other fundamental
liberties is so intensely personal that it must be left to the individuals
directly involved.' I
In my view, liberalism's relegation of symbolic concerns to private
and associative choices that are beyond public authority is essential for
equal respect for persons.91 Thus, symbolic concerns alone should not be
permitted to prevent men and women from avoiding reproduction through
Abortion and Euthanasia, 19 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 457 (1994) (reviewing DWORKIN, supra).
89. At what point such encouragement or support becomes an infringement of liberty
may be a contested issue. See infra part IV
90. For the source of the phrase "show what doing comes to," see A.R. Ammons, Boon,
NEwREPUBLIc, Aug. 1, 1988, at 48.
91. In an important sense, the history of liberalism is the history of a series of triumphs
over the symbolic, constitutive concerns of church, seigneur, and boss, freeing individuals
from the bonds of traditional ways of defining community and right action. Even in liberal
societies the battle is not over, as the symbolic and constitutive struggles to recognize the
freedom and dignity of women, gays, and lesbians show.
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the use of birth control and early abortion or from engaging in reproduc-
tion when noncoital or assisted methods are necessary to treat their
infertility At the same time, such concerns should not force people to use
technologies to which they are opposed. A less protected position for
procreative choice would insufficiently respect persons.
IV Toward a More Inclusive Approach. Infrastructure,
Regulation, and Funding
But it is also clear that liberalism, despite its essential role m our lives,
is incomplete as a morality or vision of how people should live. It tells us
what we have a right to do but gives us little help in determining whether
or how to exercise our rights. Nor does it tell us what norms or rules
should guide our interactions with others, once it is established that we are
not violating their rights.
Despite its defects, the basic structure of liberalism will continue to
shape our ethical and legal practices. Liberalism is too deeply embedded
in our culture and system of limited democratic government to be blithely
scrapped or compromised. Yet many persons are increasingly disgruntled
with its narrowness and yearn for connection with what it ignores. Indeed,
the commentators' opposition to strong procreative liberty reflects the
deeper dissatisfaction felt in many sectors with liberalism itself.'
Yet, just as liberals need to be reminded of the symbolic and systemic
effects that their rights analysis tends to ignore, the critics also have to be
reminded that liberalism does not prevent (indeed, it explicitly protects)
their efforts to identify and encourage the realization of the good as they
see it in how new reproductive techniques are used. Both liberals and
nonliberals, in all their varieties, need to recognize the insights that each
camp can offer and to incorporate them, to the extent feasible, into public
policy
The key point for policy purposes is that having rights to use
reproductive technology does not mean that particular exercises of those
rights should be encouraged or that policy efforts to discourage or not to
facilitate their diffusion would always be illegitimate. Having rights to use
92. The rise of feminist theory and jurisprudence is an example of the dissatisfaction
with liberalism that exists in many quarters. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as
Relationship, 1 REv CONST. STUD. 1, 11-17 (1993). See generally Jennifer Nedelsky,
Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7
(1989).
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reproductive technology means only that state and private actors have a
duty not to infringe or interfere with that liberty except to prevent great
harm. The state and private actors need not promote or encourage those
uses directly and, m ways short of infringement, may discourage their use.
Mutual recognition of the limitations of both rights-based and
nonrights-based approaches offers an opportunity to move the debate to a
higher, more inclusive level. A rights-based approach to reproductive
decisions is essential if most people are to be able to exercise their liberty
As the experience of individuals m nonliberal societies shows, the liberal
structure of rights of personal freedom is a great achievement that should
not be denigrated. But it is not everytlng. There is more to the world
and to procreative life than a rights-based approach can encompass. I read
Professor Meilaender, Professor Massie, Dr. Jones, and other critics,
including liberal femimsts like Professor Purdy, to agree with this
statement. But I agree with it as well! Thus there may be considerable
room for agreement and consensus here once we move the debate beyond
liberalism itself to the ethical dimensions of actual use.
The distinction in moral philosophy between the "right" and the
"good" may help situate the discussion.93 The claims that I have been
examining about the scope of procreative liberty and the role that tangible
and symbolic harms play in limiting its scope have concerned the realm of
the "right" - the realm of moral and legal duty One's right to use new
reproductive techniques is protected in part because it violates no duty to
others. Nor is there a duty to use particular reproductive techniques. For
example, couples who share Professor Meilaender's views about marriage
and procreation 4 could not be required to use IVF or artificial insemination
if they are infertile, nor could they be required to have ultrasound or
genetic tests for disease or for the sex of the fetus. They certainly could
not be compelled to abort or to use contraception.95
93. See generally W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930) (providing classic
statement of distinction between "right" and "good").
94. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 186-88.
95. In very extreme circumstances of compelling interest, forced abortion or
contraception might be appropriate, but such cases will be extremely rare. Under the
avoidable harm principle, couples could be required to use a technology deemed reasonably
necessary to prevent harm in offspring who could otherwise be born healthy See
ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 161-62. Couples may also have to accept the implicit or direct
subsidies or encouragement that public policy accords to techniques that they find objection-
able. The scope and justification of conscience clauses in the delivery of health services is
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But the realm of the "right" is not coincident with that of the "good."
While a variety of relationships between the two could be explored, one
way to conceive of that relationship is to note that the realm of the good is
not necessarily confined to or defined by that of the right. Moralities of
will and obligation may define the right, but they do not exhaust the realm
of the good.96 They are essential if individual visions of the good are to be
realized, but they say nothing about the content of the good.' That content
is for persons to decide through their values, actions, and associations.
The great defect of rights theory is that it does not tell us whether a
particular exercise of the right is desirable or good. A choice might violate
no moral duty to others, but still seem undesirable in terms of the
particular goods that individuals hold, as in the case of persons who oppose
abortion or IVF Rights theory gives little guidance here. It leaves to
individuals the burden of determimng the content of the good that will
inform and direct their lives generally, and the methods, practices, and
norms of reproductive practice in particular. Because reproduction is so
fundamental, individuals have the right to decide to use or not to use
reproductive technologies. 98 But there are better and worse ways to use
these techniques and to relate to offspring, physicians, patients, dorfors,
and surrogates. A particular morality or ethic for their actual use is
necessary to promote the good. The right permits such moralities to be
developed, but it gives no guidance on how to do so.
The ethic to be developed for use of these techniques will reflect
particular conceptions of the good. It will focus on using techniques in a
better or the best way, not on whether techniques should be permitted at
beyond the scope of this Article.
96. The right and the good are of course related, but there is an -important distinction
between them, as my differences with Professor Purdy and Professor Meilaender illustrate.
For example, Purdy is concerned with the effect of assisted reproductive techmques on
women. See generally Purdy, supra note 4. Even if she agreed that no moral rights of others
were violated by particular applications, she might still reasonably assert that the practice of
surrogacy was on balance bad for many women and, thus, for women overall. Similarly, one
may agree that there is a right to abort a pregnancy without finding every instance of abortion
to be good.
97 This point does not include the minimal sense that any conception of the good has
to allow the right its due. If rights are essential, then it will be a violation of the good to
violate them.
98. See Carey v Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); see
also Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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all. Purely symbolic concerns may be publicly recognized, as long as no
infringement of rights occurs. As long as rights are not infringed, a rights-
based approach does not prevent public policy from guiding or regulating
practice so that a particular vision of the good may be realized.
If this situation is the case, the discussion should focus not on whether
but on how the new technologies should be used. It is necessary to identify
the best ways to utilize assisted and collaborative reproduction in order to
minimize suffering and to realize the good that they offer. In defining
norms to guide practices that cannot be prohibited, one can recognize or
express the symbolic and constitutive values that rights analysis puts to the
side. While precise definition of the line between "infringing" and
"discouraging" is difficult, most policy issues will not involve such close
questions. Thus, there is ample room for individual conceptions of the
good to inform public policy and individual practice within rights-based
liberalism. These possibilities also show how a rights-based approach to
reproductive choice based on a morality of will and obligation can coexist
with a morality of trust and care."
Persons concerned about the impact of assisted and collaborative
reproduction on essentialist conceptions of marriage, the family, and
motherhood, as well as those persons who are more bothered by systemic
effects, may thus seek policies that inplement their vision of the good.
Whether they succeed in keeping to the "not encourage" rather than the
"infringe" side of the line will depend on the technology and regulation at
issue in any given case. Many issues will be contested, as a brief survey
of three issues involving support or discouragement shows.
A. The Problem of Infrastructure
One set of support or discouragement issues concerns the legal and
social infrastructure needed for effective use of these techniques. If the
general societal infrastructure of legal rights and duties, enforcement of
contracts, determination of family and rearing rights, and other regulatory
and financing apparatus were not available for participants in assisted
reproduction, the use of these techniques would be discouraged, though of
course these techiniques would not be prohibited altogether."
99. See generally BAMR, supra note 50.
100. In my view, the lack of a general societal infrastructure for assisted reproduction
would also be unconstitutional. If the use of donors and surrogates is part of an infertile
couple's constitutional right to procreate, then laws that prevent people from recruiting or
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There are two problems, however, with such an approach. First, it
would treat infertile couples unequally For example, refusing the legal
infrastructure of contract enforcement for surrogate contracts, as some
jurisdictions and many commentators recommend, when other medical and
reproductive contracts, including contracts for assigning rearing rights and
duties in sperm and egg donation, are enforced, appears to be a form of
discrimination against a particular kind of infertility 101 If noncoital
reproduction is a basic right and cannot be prohibited, such an exclusion
would appear to be an unjust discrimination against infertile couples.
Equally serious, such a position would end up creating great harm for
those who will nevertheless go forward and use the technique in question.
Without resort to the courts and the development of laws to protect the
participants, there will be more disputes and problems than would
otherwise occur. Denying infrastructure as a means of discouraging the
use of a techmque while recognizing that there is a right to use the
technique in question unfairly harms those who, as is their right, choose to
go forward. This situation is akin to punishing the children of welfare
mothers to deter the mothers from having more children and poses a major
problem for a morality of care and trust. Thus the community may be
required to provide a legal infrastructure for assisted reproductive
technologies, even though such a structure may facilitate, and to that extent
subsidize, the use of technologies that, under particular conceptions of the
good, one wishes were not used.
B. Regulation
Moralities of will and moralities of trust and care may intersect in
regulation. Certainly nothing in a liberal rights-based approach to freedom
or in the theory of procreative liberty articulated in Children of Choice
prevents a regulatory response to the dangers that exist in the use of these
techniques. Indeed, I have argued for regulation at several points in the
book in ways that are unique in the literature."°
My particular regulatory concerns have been with assuring full
information, free choice, and informed decision-making. This idea
relying on surrogates arguably infringe that right. If so, laws that ban paying money to
donors, surrogates, or others who arrange the contracts would be unconstitutional, for the
alleged harms are no more valid here than in the banmng of surrogacy altogether.
101. See generally MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988).
102. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 114-17, 136-38.
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includes gathering and dissemnatmg accurate information about risks,
costs, and success rates; certification and monitoring for quality control;
waiting periods; and other procedures to make sure that procreative liberty
is exercised freely and knowingly
When one begins to discuss the need for regulating particulaar
techniques, there is much room for agreement and disagreement. The right
to reproduce may well limit how far regulation may go, but it leaves ample
room for regulatory measures that aim to prevent the worst effects.
Careful and sensitive regulation to assure fully informed and free choices
and safe and effective reproductive techniques can address many, though
not all, of the concerns that Professor Massie, Professor Purdy, and
Professor Meilaender have. Of course, the very fact of regulation is an
imprimatur of sorts, but the alternative - unregulated use - is even
worse.
C. The Funding Dilemma
Perhaps most difficult is the question of private and public health
insurance funding of IVF and other assisted reproductive techniques.
Insurance funding will greatly increase the use of these techniques and
make more likely the ill effects on women and society that so concern my
critics. Insurance funding will also lead to more physicians offering IVF,
thus raising questions of quality and regulation. The number of lVF cycles
occurring yearly in the United States would increase, more stimulation
reactions and other complications would occur, and more multiple births
would take place. Much greater regulation will be necessary to prevent the
worst effects. Persons who wish to discourage the spread of these
techniques would strongly oppose their funding, as would those who want
to conserve health care funds. With some exceptions, tlus view is the
stance that society has taken to date.
But there are good arguments in favor of funding as well. A strong
justice argument exists for coverage based on the importance and efficacy
of the technique. Failure to fund creates a major inequity, with only the
rich and wealthy having access to technologies that could benefit the less
rich as well. Insurance coverage for one or two cycles of IVF, and
coverage of other techmques as efficacy is demonstrated, would greatly
reduce that disparity Nor should the burden of conserving health care
funds fall disproportionately on the infertile. Infertility is a serious
problem that with respect to funding deserves equal treatment with other
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nonlifesavmg medical procedures. Because many health needs that are
arguably less meritorious and cost-effective than IVF are now covered, IVF
should be covered as well. 03 If cuts m the health budget are necessary,
infertility treatments should be compared to other nonlifesavmg benefits and
should not be singled out to bear the brunt of cost savings.
Professor Meilaender and Professor Purdy claim that I am inconsistent
m my treatment of this issue, that I am now being stingy about the scope of
a right that I previously defined so lavishly They ask: If procreation is so
important that it has fundamental right status, then should it not also be
funded by the government for those persons who lack the means?" 4
The distinction between negative and positive rights - between
government interference with an individual's actions and government's
failure to fund that action - is a standard aspect of liberal legal theory A
right against state interference does not necessarily create a legal right to
state funding. Many very important things, as a matter of right, are not
funded by the state, including free speech, travel, abortion, and other forms
of medical care." 5 Although constitutional status as a negative right does not
automatically create a positive right, regardless of how desirable funding the
activity for those persons who cannot afford it may be," one may neverthe-
less argue that as a moral matter, an activity that is so valued that it deserves
negative right status should also be provided to those without means. 7 If
the distinction between moral and legal rights is kept clear, Professor
Purdy's and Professor Meilaender's point that there may be no basis for
distinguishing between negative and positive reproductive rights is apt.
The question raises a dilemma at the very heart of liberalism - its
inattention to justice and, thus, its willingness to tolerate inequities m the
103. See generally Brock, Funding New Reproductive Technologies, supra note 10.
104. See Meilaender, supra note 4, at 181, Purdy, supra note 4, at 204.
105. The Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between a right against state
interference and a right to state funding. See, e.g., Hams v McCrae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980); Maher v Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
106. In one sense this idea is not the case. Every negative right has some infrastructure
or expenditure of costs by the state and others that support or facilitate its exercise, if only
in providing an infrastructure of services that make its exercise possible.
107 As Dan Brock points out, the moral right to positive reproductive rights is not
based merely on the fact that the interests involved deserve negative right status, but rather
on the particular kinds of interests that reproductive choices involve and their connection
to fair equality of opportunity See generally Brock, Funding New Reproductive
Technologies, supra note 10.
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distribution of major necessities.10 Once considerations of distributive
justice enter, the distinction between the negative and the positive, funding
and not funding, starts to collapse. If distributive justice is given its due,
every negative right has the potential to become a positive right, thus
requiring subsidies even beyond those inherent m infrastructure and
regulation.
In the current political climate, it is unlikely that large scale funding of
IVF will occur m the United States, though Canada, Great Britain, and
France provide IVF as part of a national health care benefits package. 1" The
allocation of resources to the new reproductive technologies is an issue that
needs further study and debate. It shows another limitation of liberalism -
the failure to provide for basic needs - and may have to await further
development in liberal theory and practice before it can be resolved.
V Conclusion: Toward a Morality of Care and Trust
in Assisted Reproduction
In the end, liberals, conservatives, and feminists may be less divided in
their concerns about new reproductive technologies than their disputes over
the scope of rights contained m this Symposium indicate. All of us
recognize that some aspects of procreation are of fundamental importance,
and all of us want human dignity respected and suffering prevented in the
procreative choices that are made. Yet we disagree about the importance
and effects of particular practices and the rules that should guide procreative
conduct.
I do not agree with Professor Massie, Professor Meilaender, Professor
Purdy, and Dr. Jones that a strong recognition of procreative rights will
harm the family, women, and offspring m the ways that they have stressed.
Yet I see enough potential problems in how the infertility industry operates
and how donor and surrogate arrangements are made to agree that more
regulation is m order and that greater attention to care and trust among all
the parties would be desirable. Reasonable persons might also disagree over
how much public policies should encourage or discourage their use.
108. As my colleague Richard Markovits reminds me, the fault is not liberalism itself,
but rather that the political systems that liberalism creates often give inadequate attention to
the demands of justice.
109. See, e.g., 1 ROYAL COMM'N ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, PROCEED
WITH CARE: FINAL REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEw REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 524-26 (1994).
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In my view, our common concerns about reproductive technology do
not justify infringing the right of persons to use novel reproductive
techmques to realize their procreative plans. But they do alert us to the need
for protective or ameliorative action to lessen the potential for harm. Many
of these concerns can be addressed through careful attention to issues of
regulation, infrastructure, and funding. But public policy cannot deal with
all of the questions and challenges that remain.
At bottom, the moral problem of new reproductive technology is a
problem of how individuals should relate to one another m the varying roles
and practices that technological assistance m reproduction entails. If greed,
selfishness, and power drive those relations, the worst fears of the critics
may be realized. On the other hand, if participants respect the needs of
others, honor their free choice, and treat them as equal players, reproductive
technologies may be used well and productively for all concerned.'
The best strategy will be to adopt policies that encourage respectful,
beneficial uses, while minimizing those that harm or ignore the interests of
others involved in the reproductive endeavor. Public policy, however, can
carry us only so far m this direction. At some point, those directly involved
in providing and using new reproductive technologies must develop attitudes,
ethical codes, and patterns of practice that assure respectful treatment. This
places a duty on doctors, nurses, and embryologists to respect the needs of
infertile couples for full and accurate information, emotional support, and
high quality care. It also places responsibility on the couples who seek their
assistance to be fully cognizant of the social, psychological, and moral
significance of their novel efforts to conceive and give birth to offspring.
They are involved m the creation of new life and may be expected to show
care and concern for the embryos, fetuses, and offspring that they
produce.' They should also be respectful of the needs of the donors and
surrogates who assist them.
In philosophical terms, we must create a morality of care and trust for
how the new reproductive technologies are to be used to supplement the
110. It is too soon to tell which pattern will dominate. Just as there is cause for
pessimism from some practices, there is also ample evidence that many providers and
consumers use these services respectfully to the benefit of all concerned. At bottom, it is a
question of the attitude of the persons involved m the reproductive enterprise: Do they
approach others with an attitude of respect, care, and trust, or are they treating them as mere
means to their own selfish ends?
111. I do not mean to imply that couples may not have a right to discard embryos or abort
fetuses, but rather that they should be attentive to the symbolic meanings that others bring to
these practices so that they will not unthinkingly or frivolously offend them.
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morality of rights that protects the underlying procreative choices involved.
Attention to both moralities is necessary if the freedom to use reproductive
technology is to be used wisely and well.
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